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THE DOCUMENT AND THE DRAMA
FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION. By
James E. Fleming.1 New York: Oxford University Press.
2015. Pp. xv + 243. $75.00 (cloth).
Robert William Bennett2
Contemporary scholarly discourse on American
constitutional law is fixated on the document. Particularly when
the role of the courts is examined, the fixation is associated with
what is likely the most quoted sentence in Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinion in Marbury v. Madison: “It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”3
Marbury also explained that the Constitution is part of American
law, and so this sentence articulating a judicial “duty” seems to
suggest to scholars at least that courts have to dig deep to figure
out just how that entire piece of “law” can be coherently
“interpreted.” This fixation is perhaps apparent in the rush to
embrace the label “originalism” by scholars espousing quite a
variety of approaches to constitutional interpretation, including
some “new” ones that disdain the force of all sorts of evidence
about the “original” understanding of what the document would
accomplish. The title of James Fleming’s new book makes a
similar embrace quite explicit: “Fidelity to Our Imperfect
Constitution.” Even beyond the courts, moreover, Fleming tells
us in quite grand terms that the Constitution is to be understood
as establishing “a framework or great outline for a self-governing
people4 (p. 20).”

1. Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in
Law, Boston University School of Law.
2. Nathaniel L. Nathanson Professor of Law Emeritus, Northwestern University
School of Law.
3. 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
4. Fleming actually adverts to an appeal that originalism has on account of its
“aspiration of fidelity” to the Constitution (p. xi).
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There is an obvious awkwardness in this fixation with the
document. Unlike scholars, federal courts emphatically refuse to
grapple at large with what the Constitution is about. Thus they
have long refused to issue “advisory opinions” about the
Constitution (or any other elements of the law with which they
deal). Instead, they interpret the document only in the service of
dispute resolution, to resolve what the Constitution refers to as
“cases” and “controversies.”5 And that seems to have been what
Marshall had in mind as well. Immediately following the sentence
quoted above, he explained why the courts have that “duty”:
“Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
expound and interpret that rule.”6
Interpreting the document in resolving an ongoing succession
of disputes substantially complicates the process of ascribing
“meaning” to the document. Fleming is most certainly
appreciative of complexity in interpreting the document. The
subtitle of the book is “For Moral Readings and Against
Originalisms,” and he does tell us that with appropriate “moral
reading” of the Constitution, it embodies “abstract moral and
political principles” (p. xi). But the “moral readings” (or, as he
sometimes puts it, the “philosophic approach” (pp. xi, 3)) he has
in mind also draw on information other than the text and abstract
moral and political principles. Instead, “fit work” must be done
(p. 137). Thus under Fleming’s notion of “moral reading,” “the
best interpretation of the Constitution should [also] fit and justify
the legal materials [available to the interpreter], including the
text, original meaning, and precedents” (p. 99).7
How to deal with precedent has roiled the originalism world,
but Fleming’s embrace of a role for precedent is particularly
intriguing—and a bit puzzling. The usual justification advanced
for following precedent is the reliance that it may have generated.8

5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
7. At another point, Fleming writes approvingly of interpretation as taking account
“of our constitutional text, history, and structure, together with our constitutional practice,
tradition, and culture” (pp. 20-21). And at still another, quoting an earlier work, he puts it
this way: “‘understand text, consensus, intentions, structures, and doctrines . . . as sites of
philosophic reflection and choice about the best interpretation and construction of our
constitutional commitments’” (p. 33).
8. See Robert W. Bennett, Originalism and the Living American Constitution, in
ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE 78, 115 (2011).
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That justification is easy to appreciate if one thinks of
constitutional interpretation in dispute resolution terms. For both
parties to a dispute may at the time they interacted have had
information about judicial precedents that dealt with earlier
interactions bearing some similarity to the one they were
contemplating. If one party may have taken note of the
similarities and plausibly have relied upon the precedent, while
the other party simply ignored it, that seems pretty compelling as
an argument for the relying party when addressing the dispute
between them, at least once—a la Fleming and most of the rest of
us—a decisional role for precedent is understood as part of the
process.
To be sure, the contrast between the parties will not typically
be so stark, and there might be occasions where palpable reliance
on precedent might not seem sufficiently compelling to cause a
court to favor the relying party. It might be, for instance, that the
precedent was itself a distortion of some constitutional language.
If that makes the relying party’s reliance seem “unreasonable,”
that could be a justification for doubting its persuasive power. But
that is to implement a “reasonable” version of the reliance
justification, not to discard it. Or it might be that some gross
injustice would result from following the precedent. That would
also likely make the reliance unreasonable, but if not, there might
then be an independent justification for refusing to follow the
precedent. There could even be less strong a case than “gross
injustice” that would persuade a court that it would be best to
change the “law” represented by a precedent. And then there may
be occasions to doubt that there was any reliance on precedent.
The ways in which precedent filter through to people’s
consciousness can be subtle, however, and hence confidence that
there was no reliance on some precedent that seems relevant will
not come easily. But in any event, the reliance-based justification
for deference to precedent is readily apparent. For Fleming,
however, following precedent is not valued—apparently not one
whit—on account of reliance it may have stimulated.
Instead, Fleming seems to see a role for precedent in making
the larger interpretational enterprise more attractive. The title of
his book acknowledges that the Constitution is “imperfect,” but
Fleming’s “moral reading” approach is aimed at making the
document the “best it can be” (p. 184). Just why it matters that the
Constitution is to be made “the best it can be” is, however, left
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unexplained. In particular Fleming pays no attention to the
dispute resolution function to which both the document itself and
Marshall’s justification for judicial review direct us. At one point
I almost thought that Fleming would take the judicial dispute
resolution task to heart, but then he let me down. In discussing
why judges should not adopt “the mindset of a philosopher,”
Fleming tells us that “[t]o begin with, judges have a job to do, a
job they’re paid to do.” But then effectively all he tells us about
that job is that it “involves fidelity to the law” (pp. 79, 80).
The distinction between a focus on dispute resolution, on the
one hand, and on a more detached search for what the
Constitution is all about, on the other, is not a trivial one. And
there is peril that lurks in the scholarly fixation with the
document. For while, following Marshall, the Constitution is an
important part of our law, it is not the same thing as the drama of
one dispute resolving decision after another that is pursued in its
name.
Thus, for several reasons dispute resolution draws attention
to the specific facts of those disputes. Most fundamentally,
perhaps, the most general constitutional language will typically
have been “originally” motivated by much more particularized
problems. One obvious example is provided by sweeping
generalities found in the Fourteenth Amendment. While the
amendment nowhere mentions the problem of slavery, there is no
doubt that those generalities were in large part responsive to the
then looming questions of how the recently emancipated slave
population was to be treated. As William Rehnquist once put it,
“the Civil War Amendments . . . were enacted in response to
practices that the lately seceded states engaged in to discriminate
against and mistreat the newly emancipated freed men.”9 And
those specific problems continue to affect dispute resolution
decision making over time, in good part by generating arguments
about similarities and differences between those animating
problems and the disputes courts are called upon to resolve.10

9. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693,
699 (1976). Terry Sandalow made much the same point: “Intentions do not exist in the
abstract; they are forged in response to particular circumstances . . . .” Terrance Sandalow,
Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1046 (1981).
10. Indeed over time the courts may even renounce an original intention or expected
application of general constitutional language. Forbidding racial segregation of schools is
sometimes cited as an example of such renunciation (pp. 4, 17).
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To be sure, the contemporary dispute resolution reach of the
general language of the Fourteenth Amendment extends well
beyond problems of the newly freed slaves, none of whom are
alive today. But how did that extension come about? Fleming is
at times disdainful of “historical research to discover relatively
specific original meanings” (p. xi), but in his extensive discussion
of originalism(s), Fleming himself refers to “analogies” between
those newly freed slaves and other groups that have more recently
claimed protection under the Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause. African Americans who had never been enslaved are
perhaps the most obviously analogous, but so, according to
Fleming, are other groups to which the clause has been extended,
like women, immigrants, and gays (pp. 58-60). I have no problem
with seeing these other groups as “analogous,” though like
Fleming I recognize that analogies draw on normative judgments.
But analogies require both starting points and ending ones. In
reaching contemporary problems by analogical reasoning,
Fleming would seemingly employ original expected applications
as starting points—and then, once the process gets going, later
“applications” reached by earlier analogical steps.
It is not only the historical origins of constitutional language
where the influence of specificity is apparent. That influence is in
fact pervasive in the dispute-resolution decisional process. The
role of judicial precedent that we touched on above is actually a
many-layered thing. Judicial precedents are sometimes invoked
on account of the generalities the earlier courts articulated in
explaining their decisions, but often they are invoked on account
of their specific facts and analogies (or differences, for that
matter) that might be drawn with the dispute under consideration.
There are still other inputs into the dispute resolution process
that draw attention to the factual details of disputes. Given the
refusal to issue advisory opinions, no federal court has anything
approaching sole control over the occasions when it opines on the
Constitution. The trial courts, and even to a great extent
intermediate appellate courts, must resolve all—and only—those
disputes that litigants bring to them. To be sure, in more recent
times at least, the Supreme Court has been able largely to pick
and choose those disputes it will resolve from among a much
larger number it is urged to consider. And no doubt its choices
will sometimes be influenced by an inclination by one or more
Justices to say something about the constitutional enterprise writ
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large. But the disputes the Court does take on will still have been
initiated by litigants. And those litigants seem largely to think that
the specific facts of their cases can have a large effect on
outcomes.
This is no doubt because the facts presented in cases do
influence the deciding courts. Some evidence of that influence is
right out in the open as courts in the opinions they produce rely
not only on general statements of law but on the specific facts the
litigants have presented to them. The result is that litigants and
lawyers considering the possibility of court resolution of some
disputes will to one degree or another shape their factual
situations to make them more appealing. The most extreme
example of this is in class action and other “test case” litigation
where appealing factual settings will be selected as vehicles for
presenting more general claims. But even for litigants not so
readily associated with similar unresolved claims, a great deal of
effort is expended to present appealing facts to the deciding
courts.
With all these influences drawing courts’ attention to the
specificities of the disputes they are called upon to resolve, what
role does The Constitution play in the process? There is no simple
answer to that question, particularly when the language of the
document does not point directly to some result (and if it does,
the dispute would likely not have been brought to court in the first
place). And much of the constitutional language that is invoked
in contemporary litigation—like “due process of law, “equal
protection of the laws,” “unreasonable” searches and seizures,
“cruel and unusual” punishments, and the like—provides scant
direction in resolving disputes. We saw that Fleming himself
recognizes that courts give heed to interpretational influences
other than the language of the document.
With constitutional interpretation by the courts understood
as a means to dispute resolution, however, and with dispute
resolution encouraging a role for specific facts of disputes, one
might wonder just what the point is of insisting that courts should
make the Constitution writ large the “best it can be.” I suppose it
is hard to quarrel with making something better, including the
Constitution. But the costs of any undertaking must also be taken
into account. So one should ask whether the effort to make the
Constitution its best might bring costs as the courts grapple with
the disputes they are charged with resolving. To put the point
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another way, the rampant uncertainty of what a “best it can be”
Constitution would be like raises a question of whether the energy
of courts should be spent on that task if it gets in the way of fair
resolution of those disputes they are required to decide. Fleming’s
take on precedent itself suggests that there may well be some
dissonance in trying to combine the two tasks.
But then again perhaps I misunderstand Fleming’s criteria
for excellence, that “best” the Constitution can be. While there is
some ambiguity in his presentation, I do not take the “moral
readings” he favors to dictate a single approach. He clearly
disfavors some contemporary moral readings (thus he tells us that
the contemporary so-called “Tea Party” has “a deficient, unjust
normative theory” (p. 107)), but he seems more generally to think
that “moral reading” is an approach to interpretation, not a set of
“right answers.”11 If that is so, then perhaps the constitutional
“interpretation” he has in mind need not be aimed at a coherent
account of the document writ large. Instead, perhaps Fleming
would permit a moral reader addressing a particular dispute to
focus on the constitutional language that seems most directly
pertinent to the dispute and make that language into the “best it
can be” for resolving that dispute, without concern for how the
interpretation given that piece of language “fits” with the
document as a whole.
Such a dispute resolution focus need not lose sight of how the
constitutional language it applies will be understood for future
disputes. That is what the force of precedent dictates. Nor need
the interpretation of the most directly relevant language ignore
possible spillover effects for other constitutional language.
Obvious examples are where identical or similar language appears
more than once in the Constitution (“due process of law,”
“privileges and immunities”), but there could well be spillover
effects for constitutional language that wasn’t so obviously
implicated by a given interpretation. But for (conceptually)
remote parts of the document, the future dispute resolution reach
of a decision would be of attenuated concern at best, so that the
dispute resolution concern might stop well short of trying to make
the document as a whole “the best it can be.”

11. Fleming does mention several recent Supreme Court decisions as “egregiously
erroneous” (p. 167). But at the same time, he refers to the “big tent of the moral reading”
(p. 161).
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If Fleming would permit (dare I say, insist on) a judicial
approach to “moral reading” that is concerned with the real world
drama that occasions the judicial interpretational enterprise, then
I would have no problem with his thesis. But I don’t read
Fleming’s presentation to provide room for this sort of focused
concern with the constitutional language that bears most directly
on the dispute before the court. I think he would disparage such
an approach to interpretation as giving in to misbegotten
“pragmatic judgments,” instead of seeking “how best to elaborate
the abstract moral and political principles to which the
Constitution commits us” (p. 110).12
At the same time, it is important to keep in mind, as Fleming
does repeatedly emphasize, that dispute resolving courts are not
the only actors who interpret the Constitution. Legislatures and
executives (including administrative agencies) do so as well as
part of their jobs, sometimes with pressures of dispute resolution,
but sometimes not. Ordinary citizens can also grapple with
constitutional interpretation, though count me as dubious that
many of them do so with the aim of understanding “a great outline
for a self-governing people.” But in any event a multitude of
academic commentators like Fleming and others he discusses in
the book take on the larger interpretational enterprise with relish.
At one point, Fleming tells us that “[a] moral reading is not
inherently court-loving” (p. 153). But Fleming does not
acknowledge that different influences will operate on the various
actors that may importantly shape their interpretational efforts.
Indeed, he seems to want to assimilate the various
interpretational efforts into a common enterprise. “Instead of
judicial monopoly,” he tells us, he “embrace[s] departmentalism,
that is, dividing yet sharing interpretive authority among courts,
legislatures, executives, and the citizens” (p. 173).13
To the extent that those other actors have the luxury of
freedom from dispute resolution influences, it should not be
surprising if they occasionally reach conclusions in some tension
with those of the courts. I do not doubt that those other efforts—
most certainly including the scholarly ones—may occasionally
12. See also p. 111, where he puts emphasis on “coherence” and “integrity” in the
interpretational enterprise.
13. In not mentioning scholars as a separate category—presumably lumping them
with “the citizens” more generally—Fleming’s detachment from the real world of
constitutional engagement comes through.
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affect the judicial interpretational efforts. At the same time, there
are influences in our larger system that keep the non-judicial
actors from pursuing a host of disparate interpretational
adventures, whether or not styled as “moral readings.” Since the
courts are the most regular interpreters, our system seems to
encourage deference by others to what the courts say about the
Constitution. In that way, the judicial dispute resolution pressures
of the constitutional law drama may influence efforts to interpret
the document by all manner of interpreters. In any event, putting
all the various interpretational efforts together as an all-hands-onboard effort of “moral reading” focused on the document as a
whole does not, I fear, greatly advance the cause of understanding
what is going on.

